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Abstract
Almost 150 new sovereignties came into existence since 1945, which is about
two times the amount of independent countries by then. New individuals are in-
cluded by panel datasets based on country level data. In this paper I investigate
the impact of panel unbalancedness related to independence status of territo-
ries on the estimation of trade effects of regional trade agreements. I first find
that the inclusion or exclusion of newly independent countries affects estimation
of interest significantly, so future empirical studies using country level data are
recommended to verify more seriously about why including some newly indepen-
dent countries or dependent territories but not others in their samples. Second,
although changing independence status of territories raises up the question of
interpreting trade data as “domestic” or “international” to (previous) governing
countries (Greaves, 1954), I find that both ways of interpreting trade data yield
similar estimates of most regional trade agreements. Third, it is shown that
unless we are particularly interested in the trade effects of regional trade agree-
ments formed before 1990, we should not include observations before this time
into the sample. At last, the Monte-Carlo simulation shows that panel unbal-
ancedness caused by emergence of new countries has different impact on the
estimation of interest from missing at random or missing at minimum values.
Keywords: Regional trade agreements · Panel unbalancedness
JEL codes: F15; F53; C18




While the United Nations currently has 193 member states, almost 150 new
sovereignties came into existence only after 1940. In the year of 1960 and 1991
alone, 18 and 13 countries with sovereignty were formed respectively (Figure 1a).
According to trade data compiled by Direction of Trade Statistics, DOTS, those newly
formed countries account for more than 15 percent of international trade in 2015,
which could have either been accounted as “intra-” national trade with their colo-
nizers or “inter-” national trade of their (previously) colonizers with other countries,
had they not been independent (solid line in Figure 1b). Furthermore, the share
of trade involved non-independent regions account for around 5 percent of the so-
called world trade since the beginning of 1990s (dashed line in Figure 1b).
Figure 1: Entry of New Sovereignties and the Share of Trade
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Note: The data for figure 1a is collected from online information. The international trade data is
retrieved from DOTS deposited at International Monetary Fund. In figure 1b, the solid line represents
trade share of country pairs involving at least one country gained independence during 1962-2015.
The long dashed line represents trade share of country pairs of which both are still not independent
in 2015.
This generates at least two issues for consideration when we use country level
panel data on international trade. While external trade involving (previous) non-
independent territory may largely serve the purpose of its governor country, it is
up to evidence about whether we should interpret it as international trade of this
territory or as part of international trade of its governor country. The other issue
is to consider whether the emergence of newly independent countries has caused
unbalancedness of relevant panel datasets and what are its empirical implications.
This paper sheds light on these two issues in the context of trade effects of regional
trade agreements (hereafter, RTAs).
The issue of interpretation of trade data is minor but has a rather long history.
As raised up by Greaves (1954) almost 70 years ago in a study of British colonial
trade, the production of British colonies has been heavily subject to the need of
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England, so that “...statistics of colonial imports and exports have been inaccurately
incorporated into totals of international trade and interpreted with corresponding
inaccuracy.” (p.2 Greaves, 1954).1 Such a concern has seldom been addressed by
studies afterwards.2 In this study I examine whether the interpretation of trade
statistics of (previous) colonies affect the estimated trade effects of RTAs.
The investigation of the potential panel unbalancedness issue constitutes the
core of this paper. There are two ways in which panel unbalancedness might be re-
lated to the independence status of countries. First, newly independent countries
increase the number of distinguished individuals of the panel data. If we use the
number of observations in 2015 as the base for country pair-year data, the more
countries becoming independent before 2015, the more pair id is generated. As we
almost exclusively see new countries coming into existence rather than old countries
exiting, we see a consistent increase in the number of country pairs over time which
leads to a stronger unbalancedness of panel data for earlier periods. The second
way is related to statistic compilation capacity affected by a given territory’s inde-
pendence status. For example, trade statistic of a given territory can be compiled
more often and more accurate before its independence for reasons like more sup-
port from its governing country. Or reversely, there could be more observations after
this territory’s independence due to an independent statistic department. It is also
possible that there are more missing values around the year of its independence
due to the lack of efforts of compiling trade data during transitory times. When
such an unbalancedness cannot be completely captured by independence dummy
of countries, it will affect the unbiasedness of estimates of RTAs’ trade effects.
Consequently, depending on how profound the above mentioned situations might
have been, panel unbalancedness may be non-random and serious enough to affect
the empirical results when we evaluate policies of interest, as pointed out by many
econometric textbooks or academic papers on unbalanced panel (such as Baltagi
and Song, 2006; Baltagi et al., 2002; Kyriazidou, 1997; Nijman and Verbeek, 1992).
To address these issues, I first describe panel unbalancedness patterns of country-
pair-year level data on bilateral trade and RTAs to show its relevance to the change
of different territories’ independence status. Then, I compare key estimates derived
from different samples with various country and time coverages to show the impact
of such panel unbalancedness on estimation of interest.
The choice of country coverage is determined by whether a country is newly in-
dependent during a given sample period or not. The attention devoted to sample
1A more detailed citation of Greaves (1954) is that “...if we recognized the difference in the eco-
nomic significance of the external trade of colonial territories and of other countries. The result of
ignoring this difference has been that...statistics of colonial imports and exports have been inaccu-
rately incorporated into totals of international trade and interpreted with corresponding inaccuracy.”
(p.2 Greaves, 1954).
2For example, in the study of colonial trade by Head et al. (2010), the authors treat trade statistics
of (previous) colonies and another country as international trade, without addressing this potential
issue at all.
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periods originates from the fact that there were only 50 RTAs in force in 1990 while
more than 280 in 2017. Since the year of 1990 is almost overlapped with the last
wave of independence of new countries in modern time, we may not need observa-
tions from too early to study trade effects of most RTAs in order to avoid dealing
with the panel unbalancedness issue investigated by this paper. I show that a sam-
ple dated back to 1992 is enough for estimating trade effects of RTAs. To raise up
minimum caution of scholars in determining country coverage of related samples in
future studies, I also derive estimates when using samples of Baier and Bergstrand
(2007) and Baier et al. (2019).
In the next step, I investigate how different are the estimates when trade data
for new countries is treated as “domestic” or “international” trade to (previous) col-
onizers. Furthermore, I conduct regression analysis when allowing (previous) colo-
nizers’ RTAs to regulate the trade of their corresponding colonies until the colonies’
independence. Compared with benchmark results that treat the trade of (previous)
colonies as if the territories were always independent, the estimates do not change
significantly for most RTAs. It means that interpreting trade of (previous) colonies
either as international trade or domestic trade of their governors does not matter
significantly unless we are interested in trade effects of some particular RTAs. This
implies that the concern of Greaves (1954) is not too relevant in the context of trade
effects of RTAs.
At last, I conduct Monte-Carlo simulations to show how do the estimates of RTAs
change when panel unbalancedness of trade data is generated by different patterns
of the emergence of new countries, compared with missing at random and missing
at minimum values. It can be seen that missingness caused by occurrence of new
countries leads to biased estimation of trade effects of most RTAs. The magnitude
of the bias is similar to the bias caused by random missing pattern, when the PPML
estimator is applied.
This paper is nested in studies of trade effects of RTAs. Since the early use of
gravity equation in international trade (Tinbergen, 1962), RTAs has been one of the
few “visible” variables to proxy trade cost. Since then, the attention to RTAs has
never ceased to popularity, especially from 1990s on when RTAs start to increase
more greatly. However, there is still no agreement on either the overall trade effects
of RTAs or the disaggregated trade effects of individual agreements.
For example, Ghosh and Yamarik (2004) summarize that most studies until then
have found significant trade creating effects of RTAs (such as Aitken, 1973; Soloaga
and Wintersb, 2001, among many others), but the two authors find that the positive
coefficients of most regional trade agreements are fragile by applying the extreme
bound analysis to different specifications of the gravity equation. Nevertheless,
more recent studies such as Baier et al. (2018) and Baier et al. (2019) apply rigorous
empirical strategies to study the heterogeneous trade effects of individual regional
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trade agreement and find significant effects of RTAs on trade. Overall, there seems
to be a common sense on the overall positive effects of RTAs on trade, but it is also
commonly accepted that the estimated trade effects of RTAs can vary a lot by types
of agreements, items covered by agreements or different samples or data.3
One finding in the meta-analysis of Cipollina and Salvatici (2010) provides in-
teresting insights for this paper. It shows that using more recent sample periods
is significantly associated with lower estimated trade effects of RTAs. The authors
only briefly relate it to the fact that more recent RTAs are more “deep” and thus
play a stronger role on trade through behind-the-border reforms not captured by
RTA dummies. However, the reason for why sample period matters also reflects an
impact of a time-varying pattern in panel unbalancedness due to change in inde-
pendence status of different territories.
This study is along the strand of literature which addresses the improvement of
methodologies on estimating trade effects of RTAs. Among many others, Egger et al.
(2011) propose an instrument variable where the preferential treatment agreement
(PTA) is a function of other determinants to handle the endogeneity issue of trade
to PTA. Kohl (2014) propose a first-differencing technique on improving previous
findings and Kharel (2019) propose a two-step approach of a constrained ANOVA-
type estimation method to account for the endogeneity bias.
Due to the focus on panel unbalancedness of country level data, this paper is
also broadly nested in studies on missing values (Pampaka et al., 2016; Pasteels,
2013) and sample selections (e.g. Bruno, 2005; Semykina and Wooldridge, 2010;
Verbeek and Nijman, 1992). A more closely related paper is Helpman et al. (2008),
which deals with the sample selection issue caused by missing trade flows. However,
they do not investigate further about what causes those missing values.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data
and patterns of panel unbalancedness related to change of independence status of
territories. Section 3 presents the regression results. Section 4 describes results
from Monte-Carlo simulations when the independence processes of new countries,
and consequently missing value patterns in trade data, are specified differently. The
last section concludes.
3Papers cited here are only very few examples of a lot more empirical studies on trade effects of
RTAs. Among them, we should be aware of the criticism on what regional trade agreements can really
do as highlighted by Rodrik (2018). He gives examples of the negotiation process of NAFTA among
others and some specific items covered by the agreements, such as how the trade-related intellectual
property rights (TRIPs) entered the Uruguay Round. The narrative evidence is convincing enough to
show that regional trade agreements might purely lead to “...redistributive outcomes under the guise
of ‘freer trade”’ (p.89), which prone to rent-seekers, special interest and politically well-connected




Data on international goods trade is retrieved from IMF Direction of Trade Statis-
tics (DOTS) database. The observations date back to 1948 the earliest, which is
much earlier than another commonly used dataset on international trade (United
Nations Comtrade database). Table A.4 in Head et al. (2010) on metropolis, colonies,
and independence events is used as the main reference for the independence data
in this analysis. I also use online information such as official websites of history of
some territories for cross-checking. Data on regional trade agreements is compiled
from the World Trade Organization RTA database. Data on other gravity variables
is from CEPII. The benchmark sample period in the empirical part is 1962-2015
to avoid potentially higher inaccuracy of data for earlier sample period and to be
comparable with any results derived from Comtrade data which can only date back
to 1962.
I construct a set of RTA dummies in the following way. First, each individual mul-
tilateral agreement among all member countries is entitled with a dummy, which
indicates the membership of different multilateral RTAs. Second, all bilateral agree-
ments between individual countries are entitled with the same bilateral RTA dummy
to indicate the membership of bilateral RTAs. Third, all agreements documented by
the WTO dataset as bilateral between a multilateral RTA as a whole and other in-
dividual countries are classified as the same dummy. For example, the agreement
between European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and Bulgaria is documented as a
bilateral RTA between these two parties and the same for the agreement between
EFTA and Croatia. As a result, any country pair involving a EFTA member country
and Bulgaria or Croatia are coded as a dummy of EFTA and others.
After these steps, I divide bilateral agreements into those formed before 1993
and those formed afterwards to match the year when many countries gained inde-
pendence. In addition, I keep dummies for a few individual RTAs, including ASEAN
(ASEAN Free Trade Area), EU (European Union), GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council
Custom Union), NAFTA (Northern America Free Trade Agreement) and MERCOSUR
(Southern Common Market). Except for these individual RTAs and EFTA (European
Free Trade Association), EEC (European Economic Community) and EU, I aggregate
all other multilateral agreements into categories of currency union (CU), free trade
agreement (FTA), partial scope agreement (PSA), FTA & EIA (economic integration
agreements), CU & EIA and those not active any more to avoid issues related to
too disaggregated classification of RTAs such as higher sensitivity to measurement
errors of trade data. It should be bear in mind that individual RTAs are only formed
among independent countries. More details about the specification of RTAs can be
found in Table A1 in the appendix.
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2.2 The unbalancedness of country-pair-year panel data
Figure 2 presents the number of observations related to independence status of
DOTS trade data for 1948-2015. I follow Head and Mayer (2014) to use larger value
of export reported by the exporter (export FOB) and import reported by the importer
(import IMF) as the export value for a given transaction. A 10% mark up of FOB
export is added to the export value if the exporter reported data is used.
It is apparent from Figure 2a that the number of non-missing trade data in-
creases over time, no matter for which country pair type. The contrast between the
solid line and the dash line is interesting. Suppose a country pair is formed only
among countries which were independent before 1962 (old independent countries),
the number of those distinguished country pairs should be constant over 1948-
2015. As a result, the constant increase in the number of observations for such
country pair type (solid line in Figure 2a) implies that the average number of trade
partners of old independent countries have increased gradually over time. Or, it
may also be that those independent countries is lack of records of trade statistics
more severely in earlier times.
If this is also the case for country pairs involving countries which gained indepen-
dence only in 1962 or later, we should see similar patterns of the dash line. However,
since the dash line is more steep from the beginning of 1990s on, it may indicate
that old independent countries start to trade with newly independent countries
more than with other old independent countries during this period. Alternatively,
the soaring increase from 1990s on as shown by the dash line may just reflect an
increase of number of trade statistics related to newly independent countries for this
period. The latter case is the panel unbalancedness related to independence status
of new countries, and it is likely this case as the sudden increase of observations
overlaps with the the time when many new countries came into existence.
Figure 2b disaggregates the number of observations by independence status for
type 2 country pairs, which are composed of one old independent country and one
newly independent country. The number of observations is presented as the ratio of
number of non-missing observations to number of all distinguished country pairs
in each year. Once the number of independent countries is given for a year, the
number of distinguished country pairs is determined correspondingly, which is the
number of distinguished combination of any two independent countries. As more
countries gain independence in more recent yearly, the number of such combina-
tions increases over time.
The solid line in Figure 2b displays the share of number of observations if the
newly independent country of a given country pair has not yet been independent,
while the dash line shows the share of number of observations for country pairs
when the newly independent country has gained independence. The short-dash line
in the second axis shows the ratio of the number of observations of country pairs
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before independence to the number of observations after independence. Until 1960,
the number of observations involving dependent territories composes of about 20%
of number of all distinguished country pairs formed between independent countries.
Figure 2: Number of Observations in DOTS Related to independence Status
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Note: In panel (a) country pair has three types. The first type is formed between two countries which
were independent (old independent countries) before 1962 (solid line). The second type is formed
between one old independent country and one country which gained independence during 1948-
2015 (newly independent country). The last type is formed between one old independent country
and one territory still dependent in 2015 but is included as statistic unit in DOTS. In panel (b), only
country pairs of the second type are considered. Their number of observations is further disaggre-
gated by their independence status. The solid line shows the number of observations if the newly
independent country of a given country pair is not yet independent, while the dash line shows the
number of observations for country pairs after the newly independent country’s independence. The
short-dash line in the second axis shows the ratio of the previous two numbers of observations for
each year.
Table 1 describes the number of observations and the mean of export and mul-
tilateral RTA membership by independence status of countries/territories. If either
one of a given country pair has ever been colonized but gained independence during
1962-2015 then it is indicated by the variable “new” equal to 1. Panel A describes
the summary statistics of the complete sample by this ever independence indicator.
As can be seen, the number of observations for country pairs involving new coun-
tries account for about 40.6% of the total number of observations for the whole
sample. Also, the average export value and membership in Bilateral agreements
formed before 1993, PSA, FTA& EIA, PSA& EIA are smaller for country pairs involv-
ing new countries than those not. The average export value of the former country
pair type is only 19.3% of the average export value of the latter type. Panel B displays
similar patterns after dropping those territories not independent at all even in 2015.
There is no big change in RTA memberships. Only the number of observations for
export, bilateral agreements formed since 1993, FTA decreases a little.
In panel C, I drop country pairs not involving newly independent countries. The
dummy variable “Pre-independence” indicates a given observation of a country pair
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in a given year involves a newly independent country before its independence, while
“Post-independence” indicates the observation occurring after the newly indepen-
dent country’ independence. As can be seen, the number of observations for the
pre-independence period is much less than post-independence period, with 6% as
the ratio of number of observations of export in the first case to the second case.
Unexpectedly, the average export value for the former is about 1.5 times of the value
for the latter, which could be driven by many different reasons. For example, coun-
tries start to record trade statistics regardless of how low it is after they gained
independence but not before their independence.
It is clear that the independence of more countries brings more observations for
more recent time period, which leads to higher ratio of missing values for early peri-
ods. This unbalancedness of panel data related to independent status may further
lead to a bias in the estimation of trade effects of RTAs. Appendix A provides more
details on data preparation, summary statistics on RTA memberships, indepen-
dence information, and coverage of countries. I start the analysis with the sample
covering all the countries/territories as indicated by Table A2 in the appendix.
Table 1: Distribution of Export and RTA Membership by independence Status
Statistics Export Bilateral Bilateral CU FTA PSA FTA&EIA PSA&EIA CU&EIA
(1000 USD) Old New
Panel A: Ever Independence
New = 1 Obs 338,563 176 2,201 4,589 10,154 1,889 160 0 4,275
Mean 100678.4 0.0005 0.0067 0.0136 0.0300 0.0056 0.0005 0.0000 0.0126
New = 0 Obs 494,565 635 1,949 4,521 2,681 11,032 1,716 738 481
Mean 521147.7 0.0013 0.0041 0.0091 0.0054 0.0223 0.0035 0.0015 0.0010
Panel B: Drop Dependent
New = 1 Obs 320,457 176 2,199 4,589 10,097 1,889 160 0 4,275
Mean 102,983 0.0006 0.0070 0.0143 0.0315 0.0059 0.0005 0.0000 0.0133
New = 0 Obs 436,583 635 1,776 4,521 2,681 11,032 1,716 738 481
Mean 555,648 0.0015 0.0042 0.0104 0.0061 0.0253 0.0039 0.0017 0.0011
Panel C: Drop Not New
Pre-independence == 1 Obs 18,300 0 0 0 61 0 0 0 129
Mean 149,702 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0033 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0070
Post-independence == 1 Obs 320,263 176 2,201 4,589 10,093 1,889 160 0 4,146
Mean 97,877 0.0006 0.0069 0.0143 0.0315 0.0059 0.0005 0.0000 0.0129
Note: If either one of a given country pair has ever been colonized but gained independence
during 1962-2015, then it is indicated by the variable “new” equal to 1. “Bilateral Old”
refers to bilateral agreements between two old countries, while “Bilateral New” refers to
bilateral agreements involving at least one newly independent country. Panel A describes
the summary statistics of the whole sample by the dummy of country pairs involving
newly independent countries or not. Panel B displays similar patterns after dropping
those territories not independent at all even in 2015. In panel C, I drop country pairs
not involving new countries. According to the RTA database, a few RTAs involve non-
independent states, such as the Caribbean Community and Common Market. So the
number of observations of RTAs in panel C for “Pre-independence” == 1 is not always zero.
3 Empirical Evidence
3.1 Including new countries into the sample or not?
To estimate trade effects of the RTAs, I use the structural gravity equation as
follows (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003; Baldwin and Taglioni, 2007; Head and
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Mayer, 2014, among others):
Xijt = θ ∗ RTAsijt + Independenceijt + {λit}+ {ψjt}+ {δij}+ ǫijt (1)
where θ is the vector of coefficients of our interest. RTAsijt is a vector of different
types of RTAs. Each element of RTAsijt equals to 1 if country i, j are both in the
corresponding RTA at time t. Xijt is the nominal bilateral export from i to j at time t.
Independenceijt is the country-pair-time varying indicator of both being independent
or not dummy. It is used to capture any non-random missing pattern related to
independence status. λit and ψjt are sets of time-varying exporter and importer
dummy variables. δij controls for country fixed effects. I apply the poisson pseudo
maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator, proposed by Silva and Tenreyro (2006), for
the estimation.
If panel unbalancedness to this paper’s concern does indeed affect the estimated
trade effects of RTAs, we should expect different coefficients of RTAs when we use
samples covering different newly independent countries even after we control coun-
try’s independence indicators. This is a consequence of non-randomness in missing
values of trade data related to the change of independent status of different coun-
tries.
Table 2 compare coefficients derived from samples covering different newly in-
dependent countries and reveals a large variation in coefficients of different RTAs.
Results in column 1 provide a benchmark, where a sample covering all countries as
given by DOTS dataset is used. Only some types of RTAs have significantly positive
effects on export. Given 99% confidence level, CU, PSA, ASEAN, NAFTA, MERCO-
SUR, EU and RTA between EEC and other countries have strongly positive impact
on trade, with the magnitude ranging from 18% (e0.166−1) to 203% (e1.109−1). FTA only
has positive effects on trade at lower confidence level. Although European Union
has boosted trade significantly among member countries, trade agreement between
EU members as one party and other non-member countries is shown to decrease
trade significantly by about 11% at 99% confidence level. Besides, bilateral agree-
ments formed after 1992 also discourages trade by about 13% at 90% confidence
level.
Given our concern of more missing values for country pairs involving newly in-
dependent countries, column 2 of Table 2 shows results derived from a sample only
covering countries with non-missing observations in both 1962 and 2015, which
indicates that the included countries should have effective statistic department re-
gardless of their independence status since 1962. As can be seen, there is an in-
flation of the magnitude of many coefficients, while the significance of them almost
stays the same.
The estimated trade effect of CU& EIA increase the most, which is about 8.1 times
of the corresponding coefficient in column 1. The magnitude of positive trade effects
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of FTA, PSA, ASEAN, EU and negative trade effects of CU and RTA between EU and
other countries increases by a range of 1%-12%. Trade effect of RTAs between EEC
and other countries is about 2% lower. This first piece of evidence shows a non-
negligible role of including observations related to newly independent countries on
the estimates of interest, especially for CU, FTA, EU and RTA between EU and other
countries.
In column 3, the sample covers countries which have been independent since
1962 and also have the highest number of trade observations until the 134th place.4
Compared with column 1, there is a change of magnitude of coefficients for similar
RTA dummies as in column 2. The estimated trade effect of CU is 147%, which
is about 56% lower than the corresponding coefficient in column 1. Trade effects
of PSA and EU become even larger, which are about 3% and 7% higher than the
corresponding coefficient in column 1. The negative trade effect of RTA between EU
and others is also about 4% stronger than the result in column 1, similar as the
result in column 2.
The most interesting result is the coefficient of ASEAN and NAFTA. As only coun-
tries not yet independent until 1962 and not belonging to any individual RTA as
specified in the regression table are excluded for the third sample, change in coef-
ficients of ASEAN and NAFTA reflects that variation in countries of control group
according to independent status affects the estimates. As can be seen, it is likely
that trade effect of ASEAN has been underestimated if we do not consider the panel
unbalancedness issue caused by independent status of countries, while trade ef-
fect of NAFTA has been overestimated. Overall, the estimated trade effect of most
aggregated-level RTAs has likely been underestimated.
In spite of some variation in coefficients in the first three columns, such varia-
tion can be considered as rather stable compared with the variation in the number
of observations as can be seen in the second last row. It confirms the reliability of
estimated coefficients. Furthermore, we may say certain observations are not nec-
essary to infer trade effect of RTAs. However, it does not mean that we can include
or exclude countries/territories in the sample less carefully, as we can see from the
rest columns in the table.
The fourth column shows the results when using a sample of developing coun-
tries. It is for the purpose of providing reference for analysis using certain country
groups. We can see clearly that the magnitude and significance of most coefficients
is largely different from those in column 1. This fact casts doubt on empirical infer-
ence from samples only composed of developing countries, especially when many of
them became independent more recently.
4Most countries with fewer number of trade observations only become independent after 1962.
Observations involving Bahrain, Brunei, Qatar, Singapore, United Arab Emirates are never dropped
for the first four columns even they became independent after 1962, since they joined individual
RTAs including ASEAN and GCC.
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In the last three columns, I use two studies of Baier and his coauthors as refer-
ences to determine the coverage of countries. The coverage of countries for column
5 is the same as Baier et al. (2019), which studies the determinants of RTAs by
identifying heterogeneous trade effects of individual RTAs. Compared with column
1, the effect of PSA almost loses its significance and its magnitude decreases from
47% to 30%. Apart from this, the trade effects of FTA & EIA and GCC become sig-
nificantly negative from insignificance, with a magnitude of around 171% and 45%
respectively. The magnitude of CU, ASEAN, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, RTAs between EU
and others and between EEC and others either increases or decreases by around
4%-20%, compared with the corresponding coefficient in column 1.
Baier et al. (2019) derive a large set of 908 unique estimates of trade effects
of individual RTAs, without any discussion on why they include some countries
formed in 1960s such as Kenya or Mauritius but not other countries independent
since 1950s (such as Parkistan, Saudi Arabia and so on) in their sample, or why
they even include areas which do not have political sovereignty such as Macau but
not others, for example. Given that the coverage of countries of samples matters for
estimation, such a discussion will be helpful to indicate how robust the results are,
especially when too disaggregated RTAs are involved.
In column 6, I exclude those not independent in 1962 from the sample of Baier
et al. (2019), as it seems to be a bit arbitrary why Baier et al. (2019) include some but
not other countries/territories in their sample. The magnitude of a few coefficients
is quite different to the results in column 5. The estimated trade effects of CU now
become weaker to 133% compared with 152% in column 5, and the significance
level also decreases to 95% confidence level. After excluding newly independent
countries and non-independent territories from the Baier et al. (2019) sample, the
positive trade effects of ASEAN is about 19% lower (e0.308 − e0.441), that of NAFTA is
about 3% higher. The negative effect of RTA between EU and others is 3% weaker.
The last column presents results when the sample of Baier and Bergstrand (2007)
is used. We can see significant changes in coefficients of many RTAs, no matter
compared with results in column 1 or column 5.
The most important implication we can draw from Table 2 is that whether and
how many newly independent countries to include into the sample affects the es-
timation of trade effects of RTAs significantly. The estimated trade effects of CU,
FTA, PSA and ASEAN are particularly sensitive to such inclusion or exclusion. The
estimation of trade effects of PSA, EU, RTA between EU and others is less sensitive
but the change of magnitude can not be ignored. The second implication is that
we should be particularly careful with the panel unbalancedness issue of interest
when conducting analysis on trade effects of RTAs on different groups of coun-
tries/territories such as developed, developing or least developed countries.
At last, it is recommended to all future studies to include a minimum discussion
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of reasons for determining the coverage of countries when using country level data,
since there is a large variation in coefficients derived from samples defined in differ-
ent ways. Especially, we should devote minimum effort in explaining why including
some but not other newly independent countries or dependent territories into the
analysis for a given study for the purpose of transparency and awareness, since the
inclusion or exclusion of these territories affects the estimated trade effects of some
RTAs significantly.
Table 3 displays four statistics for each sample in Table 2: the number of ob-
servations involving newly independent countries; the ratio of this number to the
number of all observations in a given sample; the mean of export of country pairs
involving newly independent countries; the ratio of this mean to the mean of export
country pairs not involving newly independent countries. Since samples for column
3 and 6 in Table 2 do not involve country pairs with newly independent countries,
the statistics are excluded.
As can be seen, the two samples with the same coverage of countries as in Baier
et al. (2019) and Baier and Bergstrand (2007) have the lowest ratio of country pairs
involving newly independent countries. However, this does not help to derive coeffi-
cients less affected by issue of change of independence status, since the estimates
change much when newly independent countries are excluded from the sample of
Baier et al. (2019). The mean of export for country pairs involving newly indepen-
dent countries is rather similar for the first three samples, while the number of
observations of them vary a lot.5 Results estimated from the LSDV estimator are
presented in Table A4 in the appendix.
3.2 Had they not independent
In this section, I address the concern of Greaves (1954) directly in the context
of trade effects of RTAs. That is, whether the classification of trade statistics of
colonies has significant impact on the estimation of coefficient of interest. I extend
the idea of Greaves (1954) to treat all trade of colonies/dependent territories as
“domestic” trade of (previous) colonizers before their independence. For example,
since Angola gained independence from Portugal only in 1975, any trade between
Angola and a third country before 1975 is treated as trade between Portugal and the
third country. Such a classification has practical importance as Eurostat, which is
the official deposit of statistics on European Union countries, compiles trade data
of Spain with the inclusion of Canary Islands from 1997 and of France with the
inclusion of Saint Barthélemy untile 2012, for example.
Table A5 in the Appendix presents PPML estimates of RTA dummies on trade by
5There are 21 countries covered by all samples. The number of countries covered by each sample
is 216, 148, 104, 103, 66, 58, 91, respectively. The list of countries covered by each sample is
available upon request.
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Table 2: PPML Estimates from Samples with Different Coverage of Countries












Baier and Bergstrand (2007)
Bilateral (<1993) 0.077 0.082 0.077 -0.604∗∗ 0.117∗ 0.127∗ 0.105
(1.275) (1.356) (1.247) (-2.098) (1.778) (1.955) (1.644)
Bilateral (≥1993) -0.127∗ -0.155∗∗ -0.151∗∗ -0.310∗∗∗ -0.178∗∗ 0.024 -0.163∗∗
(-1.718) (-2.012) (-2.016) (-3.723) (-2.244) (0.542) (-2.129)
CU 1.109∗∗∗ 0.931∗∗∗ 0.903∗∗∗ 0.735∗∗∗ 0.925∗∗∗ 0.848∗∗ 0.952∗∗∗
(7.717) (6.787) (5.374) (2.939) (4.759) (2.352) (5.965)
FTA 0.172∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ -0.161 -0.181 0.064
(2.109) (2.782) (2.492) (2.828) (-1.177) (-1.297) (0.525)
PSA 0.388∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.405∗∗∗ 0.209 0.262∗ 0.310∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗
(3.310) (3.441) (3.516) (0.954) (1.929) (2.351) (2.935)
CU & EIA 0.151∗ 1.217∗∗∗ 1.352∗∗ 1.461∗∗∗ 1.188∗∗∗
(1.650) (3.514) (2.116) (3.108) (2.648)
FTA & EIA 0.134 0.356 0.388 -0.271 -0.996∗∗∗ 0.385
(0.541) (1.454) (1.613) (-0.817) (-5.174) (1.562)
PSA & EIA 0.093 0.096 0.102 -0.023 0.119 0.041 0.105
(0.936) (0.935) (0.975) (-0.218) (1.057) (0.380) (0.905)
ASEAN 0.384∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗
(4.449) (4.492) (4.617) (3.527) (4.805) (3.279) (4.613)
NAFTA 0.208∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗ 0.544∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗
(2.701) (2.713) (2.472) (2.770) (3.347) (3.776) (2.995)
EFTA -0.017 -0.059 -0.054 -0.336∗∗ -0.060 -0.116∗∗ -0.051
(-0.289) (-0.907) (-0.826) (-2.417) (-0.900) (-2.079) (-0.745)
GCC -0.102 -0.133 -0.112 -0.187 -0.371∗∗∗ -0.269∗∗∗
(-0.874) (-1.105) (-0.938) (-1.455) (-3.414) (-4.805)
MERCOSUR 0.514∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗
(3.348) (3.321) (3.344) (2.575) (4.618) (4.817) (3.221)
EU 0.397∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗ 0.410∗∗∗
(9.518) (9.014) (9.029) (7.312) (7.448) (8.379)
EU and others -0.108∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ 0.372∗ -0.157∗∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗
(-3.032) (-3.465) (-3.306) (1.829) (-3.546) (-3.026) (-3.616)
EC and others -0.007 -0.040 -0.038 -1.485∗∗∗ -0.013 -0.010 -0.019
(-0.297) (-1.458) (-1.366) (-3.434) (-0.450) (-0.333) (-0.661)
EEC and others 0.166∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗
(3.163) (2.851) (2.869) (4.717) (4.790) (3.381)
Inactive RTAs 0.034 0.065 0.055 0.063 0.097∗∗ 0.097∗∗ 0.076
(0.726) (1.301) (1.109) (0.286) (1.977) (1.989) (1.538)
Independence 0.147 0.611∗∗∗ 0.330 -0.150 0.557∗∗ -0.090 0.861∗∗∗
(0.885) (3.191) (1.311) (-0.564) (2.158) (-0.153) (3.869)
N 804496 580224 391297 219204 187367 149233 307364
R2 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The headings of each column indicate the coverage of countries for each sample.
“Whole” means the sample covers all countries and territories as given by the dataset.
“Spreading 55 years” means the sample covers countries whose non-missing trade value
spreads over the whole sample period. In column 3, the sample covers countries which
have been independent since 1962 and also have the highest number of trade observations
until the 134th place. Observations involving Bahrain, Brunei, Qatar, Singapore, United
Arab Emirates are never dropped for the first four columns even they became independent
after 1962, because they are covered by individual RTAs including ASEAN and GCC. In
column 4, a sample of developing countries as defined by UN UNCTAD is applied. “Same
as Baier et al. (2019)” uses a sample with the same coverage of countries or territories
as in Baier et al. (2019). In column 6, those not independent in 1962 in the sample of
Baier et al. (2019) are excluded. In the last column, a sample with the same coverage of
countries or territories as in Baier and Bergstrand (2007) is used. In the next table, the
coverage of countries for each sample is defined in the same way.
classifying trade statistics in the above-mentioned way. The regression is conducted
for the same samples as in the benchmark results. When comparing results in the
first three columns in Table A5 to the corresponding columns in Table 2, we do not
see too much difference in the magnitude and significance of the coefficients. In
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for Samples with Different Coverage of Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)





Baier et al. (2019)
Same as Baier
Bergstrand (2007)
Obs. 338,563 150,231 83,256 28,725 43,262
Ratio of the No. of Obs. 40.64 25.73 39.79 15.33 14.08
Mean of Export 100678.4 121745.7 134846.9 336787.3 217720.9
Ratio of Mean of Export 0.19 0.23 0.21 0.28 0.28
Note: The four statistics as indicated by the most left column are the number of country
pairs involving newly independent countries; the ratio of this number to the number of all
country pairs; the mean of export of country pairs involving newly independent countries;
the ratio of this mean to the mean of export country pairs not involving newly independent
countries.
particular, the estimated trade effects of ASEAN, NAFTA and EU is almost identical
in the two tables. The difference in the magnitude of all other coefficients occurs
mainly for the second sample. Compared with column 2 in the benchmark table,
treating newly independent countries as if they were not independent increases
the estimated trade effects of CU by 49.7% and makes the impact of CU & EIA
insignificant. These two RTAs display the most outstanding change in coefficients
in this counter-factual exercise. The estimated trade effects of FTA, PSA and EU
decrease by 14.5%, 2.1% and 4.2%, respectively, when the sample composed of
countries with observations spreading for 55 years is applied. For the rest columns,
changes in coefficients of RTAs are negligible.
It is then safe to say that treating trade of colonies/dependent territories as
“domestic” trade of (previous) colonizers has rather insignificant impact on the esti-
mates of interest. However, whether such a conclusion is applicable to other topics
related to international trade is not clear. At the end, most RTAs are formed after
1990, when most previous colonizers have gained independence and thus the issue
of classification of trade statistics is not so related.
To examine further whether the issue of appropriate classification of trade statis-
tics of (previously) colonizers matters or not, I also treat trade involving newly in-
dependent countries or dependent territories as part of the trade of their (previous)
colonizers through the whole sample period (Table A6 in the Appendix). This situa-
tion makes sense if after-independence trade of newly independent countries is still
strongly entangled with previous colonizers’ economic activities. The coefficients
vary more than Table A5.
A rather relevant issue of interpreting statistics related to independence of new
sovereignties is about how to specify RTA dummies correctly. Take the member-
ship of France and United Kingdom (UK) in European Community as one example.
France is one initial member country in 1953 when the Community was created.
The UK joined in 1973. Given the fact that Zimbabwe is independent from the UK
in 1980 and Vanuatu is independent from France in 1980, it is not clear whether
trade relationship between Zimbabwe and Vanuatu back before their independence
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has been affected by the European Community membership between the UK and
France as well. If the impact is de-facto significant, then our commonly used way
of specifying RTA dummies is not correct.
Table A7 in the appendix presents results when RTA dummies are specified dif-
ferently. That is, the European Community membership is entitled to Zimbabwe
and Vanuatu for the period of 1973-1979 as well in the preceding context, due to
their colonial relationships with the UK and France. The results are indicated by
columns headed with “Colonizers’ RTA”. The analysis is conducted for the sample
covering all territories as given by DOTS and the sample covering territories with
observations spreading for 1962-2015. In the first column of each sample, the re-
sults are estimated without the new assignment of RTAs, but with an additional
control variable to capture whether a given governor has experienced a split of its
colonies or not in a given year. In the third column of each sample, the split dummy
is not controlled after the assignment of new RTA membership.
As can be seen from the Table, the estimated trade effects of all RTAs are almost
identical to the corresponding results in the benchmark table. It means the way
of treating RTA dummies for (previously) colonizers and dependent territories does
not affect the estimated trade effects of them. This finding is especially surprising
for RTAs like EU, EU and others, EEC and others, since back 1960-1970s, many
territories were still under control in some of EU member countries. Had European
colonizers shared EU trade agreements does not change the estimated trade effects
of the related RTAs.
3.3 More appropriate sample period
After the second World War, there have been two waves of independence of new
countries. One is in 1960 during which 18 countries mostly from Africa gained
independence, while the other is in 1991 when 13 countries gained independence
mainly due to the dissolution of Soviet Union. Emergence of many new countries
at once causes a large increase of number of distinguished country pairs in a given
year. To make a panel sample covering the watershed years balanced, we need ob-
servations for those new country pairs for earlier years as well. Thus, we can expect
a stronger impact of panel unbalancedness due to emergence of new countries on
estimation of interest if we use a sample dated back to earlier than 1991 or 1960.
Consequently, a too long sample period may also bring the problem of panel
unbalancedness to this paper’s concern, even though a longer sample period can
generally provide more information. More importantly, it is not necessary for stud-
ies of trade effects of RTAs to include data dated back to too long time ago. The
development of RTAs tells us that more than 80% of currently existing RTAs were
formed after 1990. There were only 50 RTAs in force in 1990, while this number
is more than 280 in 2017. Unless we are interested in the effects of RTAs formed
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earlier in particular, a sample dated back to 1990 the earliest should be enough.
One additional benefit of this shorter sample period is to avoid possibly worse data
quality of observations from earlier times.
Table 4 presents the estimated trade effects when the sample period is selected
in a more defined way. The independence control variable is dropped for it does not
have significant effect on the estimates of RTAs. The first three columns show the
results when the sample is dated back to 1992, from which year on only very few
country have changed their independence status. The year is chosen also because
the formation of large amount of RTAs has not yet started as described before. The
other two sets of sample period is 1986-2005 and 1962-2000, which follow Baier
et al. (2019) and Baier and Bergstrand (2007), respectively. For a given sample
period, the regressions are run for samples covering all possible countries exclud-
ing dependent territories in DOTS, countries included by Baier et al. (2019) and
countries included by Baier and Bergstrand (2007) for comparison as before.
Since some aggregated RTAs are specified to include multiple individual agree-
ments which may be dated back to earlier than 1992, it makes more sense to com-
pare coefficients of agreements which are formed after 1991 with the corresponding
coefficients in Table 2. In particular, two aggregated RTAs, FTA and FTA& EIA, only
contain individual agreements which are formed during 1992-2015. Four individual
agreements under consideration are ASEAN (1992.01), NAFTA (1994.01), MERCO-
SUR (1991.11) and GCC (2003.01). Among them, the estimated trade effects of
FTA, ASEAN, MERCOSUR and NAFTA have the most obvious change as shown by
the first three columns.
More specifically, the trade effect of FTA becomes significantly negative to 21%-
32% and rather stable across samples of different country coverage. ASEAN is
estimated to increase trade by 38%, 9% lower than the effect estimated by using
the sample dated back to 1962. When the country coverage of Baier et al. (2019)
and Baier and Bergstrand (2007) is used, ASEAN is also shown to have about 9%
weaker positive effect on trade than the corresponding estimated effect in Table
2. As for the trade effect of MERCOSUR, it loses significance when using shorter
samples, no matter which coverage of countries is used. In addition, trade effect of
GCC is estimated to be 20% when sample covering the same countries as Baier and
Bergstrand (2007) is used, compared with -31% shown in column 7 in Table 2.
One astonishing contrast is the estimated trade effects of NAFTA. While the
agreement is estimated to increase trade by 23% when the sample covering the
period 1962-2015 is used, it does not have significant effect on trade any more
when only 1992-2015 data is used. Such a contrast is consistent with what Cipol-
lina and Salvatici (2010) find that using more recent sample periods is significantly
associated with lower estimated trade effects of RTAs. Given large amount of ob-
servations on the increase of trade among the the three member countries after
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the formation of NAFTA, one potential explanation for the insignificance is that the
NAFTA dummy cannot capture the effect of behind-the-border reforms given the in-
significant estimate is valid as Cipollina and Salvatici (2010) suggest. Alternatively,
if trade creation effect has happened before the time of official effective data, then
a sample beginning with the year of 1992 might not be enough to capture the true
effect of NAFTA.
Combining results in first three columns in Table 4 and the corresponding re-
sults in Table 2, we can see that the estimated trade effects of FTA, ASEAN, NAFTA
and MERCOSUR are more sensitive to the choice of sample period, rather than the
choice of country coverage. This can be inferred from the similarity of coefficients
for each of the RTA dummies across the three columns in Table 4 and the variation
in coefficients between Table 4 with the corresponding ones in Table 2. Instead, the
estimated trade effect of GCC is more sensitive to the choice of country coverage.
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Table 4: PPML Estimates Derived from Samples Covering Different Periods














Baier et al. (2019)
Baier and
Bergstrand (2007)
Bilateral (<1993) -0.119 -0.146 -0.115 -0.006 0.010 0.007 0.075 0.120** 0.113**
(-1.196) (-1.330) (-1.093) (-0.116) (0.183) (0.137) (1.485) (2.243) (2.131)
Bilateral (≥1993) 0.064* 0.030 0.041 -0.006 -0.011 -0.016 0.010 0.056 0.051
(1.835) (0.773) (1.087) (-0.118) (-0.181) (-0.274) (0.240) (0.856) (0.821)
CU 0.666*** 0.036 0.798*** 0.640*** 0.448*** 0.433*** 1.109*** 1.191*** 1.265***
(3.547) (0.175) (3.754) (6.038) (2.879) (4.233) (11.296) (5.204) (11.058)
FTA -0.188*** -0.276*** -0.195** -0.007 -0.489*** -0.113 0.100 -1.147*** -0.696**
(-3.056) (-3.021) (-2.451) (-0.103) (-5.341) (-0.837) (0.658) (-5.573) (-2.291)
PSA -0.055 -0.143 -0.123 0.655** 0.749*** 0.812*** 0.811***
(-0.475) (-1.100) (-0.961) (2.211) (9.549) (7.371) (9.729)
CU and EIA -0.309 -0.323 -0.535 -0.571 1.264*** 1.520***
(-1.579) (-0.663) (-1.503) (-1.465) (5.216) (5.431)
FTA and EIA 0.178 -0.770*** 0.508*
(0.631) (-3.528) (1.847)
PSA and EIA -0.008 -0.005 -0.011 0.147** 0.141* 0.139* 0.393* 0.654*** 0.695***
(-0.082) (-0.045) (-0.096) (2.222) (1.916) (1.870) (1.791) (2.807) (3.112)
ASEAN 0.324*** 0.374*** 0.356*** 0.294** 0.311** 0.294* 0.531*** 0.592*** 0.581***
(3.800) (4.044) (3.893) (2.070) (1.982) (1.888) (4.562) (4.739) (4.732)
NAFTA -0.039 -0.047 -0.028 0.183*** 0.221*** 0.211*** 0.262*** 0.300*** 0.285***
(-0.407) (-0.448) (-0.278) (2.917) (3.342) (3.305) (4.121) (4.512) (4.423)
EFTA -0.030 -0.108 -0.071 -0.077 -0.097 -0.092 -0.027 -0.028 -0.029
(-0.392) (-1.281) (-0.791) (-1.243) (-1.414) (-1.332) (-0.547) (-0.554) (-0.571)
GCC -0.143 -0.359*** -0.181*** -0.257** -0.873*
(-1.168) (-3.912) (-4.692) (-2.220) (-1.671)
MERCOSUR 0.356* 0.155 0.354* 0.405*** 0.364*** 0.387*** 0.674*** 0.659*** 0.654***
(1.880) (1.556) (1.868) (5.021) (3.768) (4.506) (8.281) (10.524) (9.411)
EU 0.240*** 0.230*** 0.244*** 0.111*** 0.092** 0.102** 0.343*** 0.279*** 0.322***
(5.536) (4.747) (4.980) (2.958) (2.064) (2.298) (5.955) (4.565) (5.441)
EU and others -0.041 -0.080* -0.074* -0.024 -0.031 -0.044 0.104*** 0.094** 0.103**
(-1.153) (-1.770) (-1.699) (-0.617) (-0.721) (-1.116) (2.682) (2.280) (2.384)
EC and others -0.013 -0.038 -0.031 0.090*** 0.096*** 0.092*** 0.099*** 0.082*** 0.083***
(-0.544) (-1.276) (-1.041) (3.319) (2.776) (2.741) (3.298) (2.678) (2.643)
Inactive RTAs -0.557*** -0.980*** -0.888** 0.125*** 0.145*** 0.138*** 0.142*** 0.172*** 0.154***
(-2.779) (-4.104) (-2.025) (3.584) (3.762) (3.648) (4.373) (5.221) (4.677)
EEC and others 0.179*** 0.251*** 0.205***
(3.872) (5.204) (4.278)
N 489248 91280 161361 314813 71844 122914 387994 118335 193235
R2 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.4 Optimal composition of the sample
Previous discussions indicate that there might be an optimal composition of sam-
ple for the study of trade effects of RTAs, in the presence of emergence of many
newly independent countries. On one hand, excluding some newly independent
countries or dependent territories with too few observations and with no RTA mem-
bership from the sample may help to alleviate the impact of panel unbalancedness
issue related to those territories. On the other hand, a sample dated back to too
long time ago is not necessary for the estimation of trade effects of most RTAs while
it can avoid dealing with the issue of panel unbalancedness of interest, since most
newly independent countries have gained independence by the beginning of 1990s.
Figure 3 extends the analysis of section 3.3. It shows the estimated coefficients of
all RTAs under discussion from samples covering different periods, beginning from
the year as indicated by x-axis value until 2015. Any insignificant coefficient is
deleted by the Figure and shown as missing values. In addition, if most coefficients
of a given RTA are insignificant, the distribution of them is not shown in the Figure
either.
Considering RTAs which are formed during 1992-2015 period (FTA and FTA&
EIA, ASEAN, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, GCC), sample period dated back to 1992 is nec-
essary as more recent samples deliver increasing (MERCOSUR) or decreasing (FTA,
ASEAN) coefficients. If we use samples dated back to earlier until some time around
1978, the coefficients of these RTAs still experience variation. However, as I have
mentioned before, since those RTAs were formed rather recently and the beginning
of 1990s is overlapped with another wave of emergence of newly independent coun-
tries, we can use sample dated back to 1990 the earliest to derive more reliable
coefficients for these RTAs.
Considering those RTAs formed earlier, it is interesting to see a change of pattern
of coefficients around 1992. For example, the estimated trade effects of CU has
increased obviously if we use samples only dated back to 1992, compared with
samples dated back to earlier until around 1978. One immediate explanation is
that the 1991 dissolution of Soviet Union causes a great increase of countries and
thus number of country pairs as the individual base of panel data, which affects
the estimation of trade effects of CU. Apart from this, it is under discussion about
why samples dated back to the beginning of 1970s or even earlier deliver rather
constant estimates of most RTAs.
Based on information provided by Figure 3, I use 1975 and 1992 as two critical
thresholds to determine the sample period. With a sample of 1975-2015, I investi-
gate trade effects of all RTAs as specified in this paper. With a sample of 1992-2015,
I pay more attention to estimated trade effects of RTAs formed more recently. For
both samples, I exclude territories still dependent in 2015 and those were not yet
independent in 1975 or 1992 for the two corresponding sample periods. Since treat-
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ing trade involving newly independent countries or dependent territories as part of
trade of their (previous) colonizers does not affect the estimation much, I do not
treat trade statistics of relevant territories in the counterfactual way. Table A8 in
the appendix shows the results.
Given the sample period, a sample excluding only dependent territories delivers
slightly different coefficients from a sample excluding also countries not yet inde-
pendent in 1975 or 1992. It is more reasonable to trust coefficients derived from a
sample excluding both dependent territories and those not yet independent, since a
territory not independent yet is not committed to any given RTA as specified in this
study. For RTAs formed later, results derived from the sample covering 1992-2015
is more reliable. Overall, we can see from column 2 in Table A8 that Bilateral RTAs
have no significant trade effects. The significantly trade effects of CU, PSA, ASEAN,
EU, RTA between EEC and others are 165% (e0.974−1), 39% (e0.327−1), 37% (e0.315−1),
50% (e0.407 − 1) and 15% (e0.142 − 1), respectively. In contrast, FTA and RTA between
EU and others decrease trade significantly by 22% (e0.197 − 1) and 12% (e0.112 − 1)
respectively at 99% confidence level. Other RTAs only have insignificant or lowly
significant effects on trade.
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4 Monte-Carlo Simulation
4.1 Design of the simulation
As outlined in the introduction, panel unbalancedness can be related to the
change of independent status in two ways. One way is the change of number of
individuals over time. The other way is the change of data compilation capacity re-
lated to a territory’s independence status. Both channels may likely generate panel
unbalancedness pattern quite different from random missing or missing from other
processes. While last section discusses several specific issues related to indepen-
dence status of territories on the evaluation of trade effects of RTAs, this section
studies more generally the impact of panel unbalancedness caused by independence
status of territories on the estimates of interest.
More specifically, I compare coefficients derived from samples when missing
values in trade are caused by non-existence of some countries before their inde-
pendence and coefficients derived from samples with other missing processes in
a Monte-Carlo (MC) simulation exercise. To avoid too long time of convergence, I
use samples for the period of 1986-2005 in the MC study, the same as Baier et al.
(2019). To mimic the process of emergence of new countries, I assume some coun-
tries are independent in different years randomly. Once they are independent, they
are never ceased to be dependent.
To capture the impact of different waves of independence of territories, the fol-
lowing experiments are conducted: (1) 10 countries are randomly selected to be
independent in the year of 1990, 10 in 1995 and 10 in 2000, respectively; (2) 10
countries are randomly selected to be independent in the year of 1990, 10 in 1995
and 30 in 2000; (3) 10 countries are randomly selected to be independent in the year
of 1990, 30 in 1995 and 30 in 2000. Several countries are never drawn as newly
independent countries.6 Before the independence of a given country, bilateral trade
between a country pair involving this country is assumed to be missing.
Given a total number of 216 independent countries as in the year of 2015, the
ratio of missing values caused by non-existence of new countries is 11.9%, 23.1%
and 29.3%, respectively for the above three experiments. Corresponding to each
experiment, I also draw samples with random missing and missing at minimum
values for the corresponding ratio of 0.119, 0.231 and 0.293 of the calibrated bilat-
eral trade flows. When one unbalanced panel is caused by random missingness, we
should expect negligible effect of such unbalancedness on estimates according to
Head and Mayer (2014) when using LSDV estimator. I conduct the MC simulation
for 200 times for each experiment.
I follow the structural gravity model as in Head and Mayer (2014) to generate
6These countries are Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Mexico, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Portugal, Spain, United States, United Kingdom.
22
the calibrated bilateral trade flows. First, we should use the LSDV estimator with
country-year and country pair fixed effects on real trade data to derive the error
terms. Second, the error terms are applied as the stochastic term to the following
equation to construct trade cost value between two countries:
φni = exp(−lnDistni + βRTAsnit)ηni,
where ηni is a log-normal random term derived from the first step. φni is the trade
cost exporting from country i to country n. Distni refers to distance between country
i and n. RTAsnit is a set of RTA dummies as specified in Section 3.4. β is a vector
of coefficients for RTA dummies. The values for each RTA parameter is set to follow
the results in Section 3.4 and are listed in Table A9 in the appendix. The third step
is to recover multilateral resistance terms Φn and Ωi as indicators for accessibility-
weighted sum of the exporter capabilities for all countries of country n and market
potential or access for all countries of country i. The last step is to generate bilat-






φni, where Yi is the value of production and Xn is the value of
importer’s expenditure on all source countries. Once we get the calibrated bilateral
trade flows, we can generate missing values based on the processes described in the
previous paragraph and estimate trade effects of RTA dummies correspondingly.
4.2 Simulation results
Table 5 presents the MC results derived from the PPML estimator. Values in rows
without any bracket is the mean of estimates based on 200 repetitions. Values in
rows with “( )” are the mean of standard errors from each regression for the corre-
sponding variable. Values in rows with “[ ]” are the standard errors of estimates.
Since some RTA dummies are dropped due to collinearity in the simulation process,
Table 5 only reports coefficients for RTA dummies of CU, FTA, PSA, ASEAN, EU and
RTA between EU and others. Based on estimations in Section 3.4, the parame-
ter values of those dummies are set to be 0.97, -0.2, 0.33, 0.32, 0.41 and -0.11,
respectively.









) country pairs existed for the
period of 1986-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2005, respectively. If all coun-
tries had been independent since 1986, there would have been 23220 (C2
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) country
pairs through 1986-2005. The ratio of missing values caused by such process of
independence is then 0.119 for 1986-2005.
From panel A, the biggest deviation of estimates to the true parameter shows
up for the coefficient of ASEAN, regardless of missing processes. The gap in the
estimates and true parameter is about 21% for the first two missing processes and
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26.5% for the missingness at minimum value process. Missingness caused by oc-
currence of new countries causes the largest bias of coefficients of FTA and RTA
between EU and others, compared with the other two missing processes. More
specifically, the bias is about 5.5% for FTA and 2% for RTA between EU and others.
The bias is the least for PSA, ASEAN and EU from the missing process of our main
interest, compared with bias from the other two missing processes.
Such a bias pattern also holds when inspecting the other two panels. In the sec-
ond experiment, the number of country pairs for the period of 1986-1989, 1990-
1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2005 is 13695, 15400, 17205, 23220, respectively. The
ratio of missing values is 0.231. In the third experiment, the number of country
pairs for the four time periods is 10585, 12090, 17205, 23220, respectively. Thus,
only 146 countries were independent for the period of 1986-1989, (10,30,30) coun-
tries independent in (1990, 1995, 2000) in the last experiment. The ratio of missing
values is 0.293.
Overall, missingness caused by occurrence of new countries leads to biased es-
timation of trade effects of most RTAs, especially of ASEAN. The magnitude of the
bias is similar as bias caused by random missing pattern, which is not negligible
when the PPML estimator is applied. In contrast, missingness at minimum values
causes the biggest bias in all three experiments.
We have one additional observation from comparing results in panel B and panel
C. That is, the increase of ratio of missing values does not necessarily yield bigger
bias. In particular, the coefficients of FTA and PSA are even closer to the true
parameters in the third experiment, no matter which missing process we generate.
This holds for results when the LSDV estimator is applied. The reason why this is
the case is open for future research. Table A10 presents results when the LSDV
estimator is applied.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I study the impact of unbalancedness caused by emergence of new
countries on the evaluation of trade effects of regional trade agreements. I mainly
deal with the following two issues. First, should we interpret trade statistics of non-
independent territories as “international” trade, given trade data for those territories
may date back to their pre-independence period? Second, how does the panel un-
balancedness of country level data related emergence of new countries affect the
estimation of trade effects of RTAs?
I find that treating trade of colonies as part of trade of their colonizers does
not affect the coefficients of RTAs very much, compared to treating them as “in-
ternational” trade of colonies. In addition, the exclusion of those countries with
fewer observations does not affect the estimates of most types of RTAs, although we
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Table 5: Effects of Missing Values Caused by Occurrence of New Countries
Method CU FTA PSA ASEAN EU EU and Others
Panel A: (10,10,10) independent in (1990,1995,2000)
Occurrence of 0.924 -0.135 0.338 0.155 0.379 -0.088
New Countries (0.137) (0.148) (0.277) (0.442) (0.222) (0.166)
[0.157] [0.182] [0.359] [0.804] [0.279] [0.202]
Random 0.928 -0.142 0.261 0.137 0.34 -0.101
Missing (0.132) (0.149) (0.286) (0.467) (0.168) (0.140)
[0.154] [0.167] [0.383] [0.791] [0.194] [0.178]
Missing of Min. Values 0.920 -0.143 0.260 0.106 0.330 -0.105
(0.124) (0.142) (0.269) (0.451) (0.157) (0.133)
[0.140] [0.160] [0.343] [0.741] [0.186] [0.168]
Panel B: (10,10,30) independent in (1990,1995,2000)
Occurrence of 0.921 -0.162 0.316 0.2 0.371 -0.131
New Countries (0.148) (0.16) (0.299) (0.457) (0.237) (0.169)
[0.145] [0.202] [0.363] [0.848] [0.333] [0.214]
Random 0.919 -0.162 0.273 0.117 0.339 -0.093
Missing (0.137) (0.158) (0.292) (0.448) (0.177) (0.149)
[0.174] [0.188] [0.415] [0.746] [0.228] [0.196]
Missing of Min. Values 0.891 -0.151 0.292 0.137 0.329 -0.106
(0.123) (0.141) (0.264) (0.439) (0.156) (0.133)
[0.151] [0.162] [0.350] [0.704] [0.200] [0.171]
Panel C: (10,30,30) independent in (1990,1995,2000)
Occurrence of 0.931 -0.190 0.336 0.204 0.384 -0.093
New Countries (0.154) (0.158) (0.292) (0.433) (0.232) (0.171)
[0.185] [0.181] [0.396] [0.854] [0.322] [0.215]
Random 0.922 -0.161 0.320 0.112 0.342 -0.114
Missing (0.145) (0.161) (0.302) (0.467) (0.185) (0.152)
[0.174] [0.188] [0.392] [0.812] [0.227] [0.196]
Missing of Min. Values 0.869 -0.165 0.307 0.092 0.335 -0.116
(0.125) (0.140) (0.260) (0.45) (0.159) (0.131)
[0.151] [0.170] [0.331] [0.676] [0.193] [0.160]
Note: Values in rows without any bracket is the mean of estimates based on 50 repetitions.
Values in rows with ”( )” are the mean of standard errors for the corresponding variables.
Values in rows with ”[ ]” are the standard errors of estimates. The ratio of missing values
is set to be 0.109, 0.212 and 0.238 according to the setting of independence of countries.
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should not select the coverage of countries arbitrarily. The investigation of optimal
sample periods shows that a sample dated back to 1992 is cost efficient for estimat-
ing trade effects of RTAs, given the stronger wave of emergence of new countries in
1991 and earlier.
The Monte-Carlo simulation results show that missing values of trade caused by
independence of new countries cause bias of the estimates of RTAs. The magnitude
of the bias is more similar to bias caused by random missingness. Moreover, such
a bias is not linear with the ratio of missing values. One interesting finding from
the MC study is that the LSDV estimator performs better when missing is caused
by independence of new countries than two other missing processes.
The main implications of findings of this paper include: (1) the interpretation of
trade of (previous) colonies or dependent territories does not affect the evaluation of
trade policies that much, at least not much in the context of trade effects of RTAs;
(2) we should verify the coverage of countries more diligently when country level
data is applied; (3) we can choose the coverage of countries and sample periods in
a more defined way and a sample dated back to 1992 is good enough to estimate
trade effects of most RTAs; (4) the magnitude of bias of the key coefficients caused
by independence status of new countries is similar to that caused by random miss-
ingness when the PPML estimator is applied.
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Appendix A: Data Preparation and Summary Statistics
Table A1: The Specification of RTAs
RTA Abbreviation Name Entry into force
CU CAN Andean Community 1988.05
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 1994.12
EAC East African Community 2000.07
CEMAC Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa 1999.06
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States 1995.08
WAEMU West African Economic and Monetary Union 2000.01
PSA ECO Economic Cooperation Organization 1992.02
LAIA Latin American Integration Association 1981.03
MSG Melanesian Spearhead Group 1994.01
PTN Protocol on Trade Negotiations 1973.02
PSA&EIA APTA Asia Pacific Trade Agreement 1976.06
CU&EIA CARICOM Caribbean Community and Common Market 1973.08
EAEU Eurasian Economic Union 2015.01
Inactive RTAs AFRICM African Common Market 1963.07-1998.12
ARABCM Arab Common Market 1965.01-1998.12
ARUSHA Arusha Agreement 1971.01-1976.04
CARIFTA Caribbean Free Trade Association 1968.05-1973.08
ESTLATLIT Estonia - Latvia - Lithuania 1994.04-2004.05
EAEC Eurasian Economic Community 1997.10-2015.01
LAFTA Latin American Free Trade Association 1961.06-1980.01
TRIPARTITE Tripartite Agreement 1968.04-1990.12
YAOUNDE1 Yaoundé I 1964.01-1971.01
YAOUNDE2 Yaoundé II 1971.01-1976.04
FTA AGADIR Agadir Agreement 2007.03
CEFTA Central European Free Trade Agreement 2007.05
CEZ common economic zone 2004.05
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States 1994.12
PICTA Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement 2003.04
PAFTA Pan-Arab Free Trade Area 1998.01
SAFTA South Asian Free Trade Agreement 2006.01
SADC Southern African Development Community 1992
FTA&EIA TPSEP Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership 2006.05
GUAM The GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development 2006.05
ASEAN ASEAN Free Trade Area 1992.01
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council: Custom Union 2003.01
MERCOSUR Southern Common Market 1991.11
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 1994.01
EC and others 1964-2007
EU and others 1973-
EEC and others 1962-1981
EFTA European Free Trade Association 1960.05
EU European Union 1958.01
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Table A2: Countries/Territories Covered by the Whole Sample
Country Country Independent Year Country Independent Year Country Independent Year
Australia Yugoslavia, SFR Cabo Verde 1975 Malawi 1964
Austria Mozambique 1975 Tanzania 1964
Belgium-Luxembourg Papua New Guinea 1975 São Tomé & Prı́ncipe 1975 Zambia 1964
Canada Timor-Leste, Dem. Rep. of 2002 Gambia, The 1965
Switzerland Burundi 1962 Barbados 1966
Chile Rwanda 1962 Finland 1917 Botswana 1966
China, P.R.: Mainland Lithuania 1990 Guyana 1966
Colombia Faroe Islands 0 Armenia, Republic of 1991 Lesotho 1966
Costa Rica Greenland 0 Azerbaijan, Republic of 1991 Yemen, P.D. Rep. 1967
Cuba Iceland 1944 Belarus 1991 Mauritius 1968
Germany Estonia 1991 Eswatini, Kingdom of 1968
Denmark French Territories: New Caledonia 0 Georgia 1991 Fiji 1970
Dominican Republic French Territories: French Polynesia 0 Kazakhstan 1991 Tonga 1970
Ecuador Lebanon 1943 Kyrgyz Republic 1991 United Arab Emirates 1971
Spain Syrian Arab Republic 1946 Latvia 1991 Bahrain, Kingdom of 1971
Ethiopia Cambodia 1953 Moldova 1991 Qatar 1971
France Lao People’s Democratic Republic 1954 Tajikistan 1991 Bahamas, The 1973
United Kingdom Vietnam 1954 Turkmenistan 1991 Grenada 1974
Eastern Germany Morocco 1956 Ukraine 1991 Seychelles 1976
Gibraltar Tunisia 1956 Uzbekistan 1991 Dominica 1978
Greece Guinea 1958 Solomon Islands 1978
Guatemala Benin 1960 Namibia 1990 Tuvalu 1978
Honduras Burkina Faso 1960 Kiribati 1979
Haiti Central African Republic 1960 Equatorial Guinea 1968 St. Lucia 1979
Hungary Côte d’Ivoire 1960 St. Vincent and the Grenadines 1979
Iran, Islamic Republic of Cameroon 1960 South Sudan 2005 Zimbabwe 1980
Italy Gabon 1960 Antigua and Barbuda 1981
Japan Madagascar 1960 Anguilla 0 Belize 1981
Korea, Republic of Mali 1960 Bermuda 0 St. Kitts and Nevis 1983
Kosovo, Republic of Mauritania 1960 Montserrat 0 Brunei Darussalam 1984
Liberia Niger 1960 South Africa 1910 Nauru 1968
Luxembourg Senegal 1960 Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of 1919 Somalia 1960
Mexico Chad 1960 Ireland 1921
Myanmar Togo 1960 Egypt 1922 Guam 0
Mongolia Algeria 1962 Iraq 1932 Philippines 1946
Nicaragua Comoros 1975 Jordan 1946 Micronesia, Federated States of 1979
Netherlands Djibouti 1977 Bangladesh 1947 Marshall Islands, Republic of 1986
Norway Vanuatu 1980 India 1947 Palau 1994
Nepal New Zealand 1947
Oman Eritrea 1941 Pakistan 1947 Slovenia 1991
Panama Libya 1951 Israel 1948 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995
Peru Sri Lanka 1948
Poland Aruba 0 Sudan 1956 Argentina 1816
Portugal Netherlands Antilles 0 Ghana 1957 Bolivia 1825
Paraguay Curaçao 0 Malaysia 1957 Belgium 1830
Romania Sint Maarten 0 Cyprus 1960 Bulgaria 1908
Russian Federation Indonesia 1949 Nigeria 1960 Albania 1913
Saudi Arabia Suriname 1975 Kuwait 1961 Vatican 1929
Serbia and Montenegro Sierra Leone 1961 Bhutan 1949
El Salvador Samoa 1962 Jamaica 1962 Congo, Democratic Republic of 1960
San Marino Trinidad and Tobago 1962 Congo, Republic of 1960
Sweden Yemen, Republic of 1990 Uganda 1962 Croatia 1991
Thailand Kenya 1963 Czech Republic 1993
Turkey Brazil 1822 Singapore 1963 Slovak Republic 1993
Uruguay Guinea-Bissau 1974 Maldives 1964 Montenegro 2006




Table A3: Countries/Territories Coverage of Other Samples
Covered by All Hong Kong Burkina Faso Kenya Yugoslavia, SFR Nauru Poland Dominican Republic
Argentina Honduras Bulgaria Cambodia South Africa Oman Portugal Algeria
Bolivia Haiti Bahrain Kuwait Zimbabwe Pakistan Qatar Spain
Brazil Hungary Bahamas Laos Developing Peru Romania Ethiopia
Canada Ireland Belize Lebanon Aruba Palau Senegal Finland
Chile Iraq Bermuda Liberia Anguilla Papua New Guinea Singapore France
China Iceland Barbados Libya Netherlands Antilles Paraguay Sweden Gabon
Cameroon Israel Brunei Darussalam Macao United Arab Emirates French Polynesia Tanzania United Kingdom
Colombia Italy Central African Republic Madagascar American Samoa Qatar United States Ghana
Costa Rica Jamaica Switzerland Mali Antigua and Barbuda Saudi Arabia South Africa Gambia, The
Ecuador Jordan CIS Malta Azerbaijan Singapore Excluding new Guinea-Bissau
Egypt Japan Côte d’Ivoire Myanmar Bahrain El Salvador Australia Greece
Indonesia Cambodia Congo, Demo. Rep.of Mongolia Belize Suriname Austria Guatemala
India Kuwait Congo, Republic of Mozambique Barbados Sint Maarten Bulgaria Guyana
Iran Lebanon Cabo Verde Mauritania Brunei Darussalam Seychelles Switzerland Hong Kong
Korea, Republic of Liberia Czechoslovakia Mauritius Botswana Syrian Arab Republic Cyprus Honduras
Sri Lanka Libya Cuba New Caledonia Côte d’Ivoire Turkmenistan Germany Haiti
Morocco Madagascar Cyprus Niger Congo, Republic of Tonga Denmark Hungary
Mexico Mali Germany Nicaragua Cabo Verde Taiwan Spain Ireland
Malaysia Myanmar Djibouti Netherlands Cuba St. Vincent and the Grenadines Finland Israel
Nigeria Mauritania Denmark Norway Curaçao Venezuela France Italy
Panama Nicaragua Dominican Republic Nauru Dominica Vietnam United Kingdom Jamaica
Philippines Netherlands Algeria New Zealand Dominican Republic Samoa Greece Japan
Thailand Norway Spain Oman Algeria South Africa Hungary Kenya
Trinidad and Tobago New Zealand Ethiopia Pakistan Estonia Zimbabwe Ireland Madagascar
Tunisia Oman Finland Peru Ethiopia Same as Baier et al. (2019) Iceland Mali
Turkey Pakistan Fiji Papua New Guinea Fiji Australia Israel Mozambique
Uruguay Peru Falkland Islands Poland Micronesia Austria Italy Mauritania
Independent since 1962 Poland France Portugal Gabon Bulgaria Jordan Mauritius
Afghanistan Portugal Faroe Islands Paraguay Ghana Switzerland Japan Niger
Albania Paraguay Gabon French Polynesia Equatorial Guinea Cyprus Kuwait Nicaragua
Australia Romania United Kingdom Qatar Grenada Germany Myanmar Netherlands
Austria Saudi Arabia Ghana Romania Guatemala Denmark Niger Norway
Bulgaria Sudan Gibraltar Saudi Arabia Guam Spain Netherlands New Zealand
Switzerland Senegal Guinea Sudan Guyana Finland Norway Pakistan
Côte d’Ivoire Sierra Leone Gambia, The Senegal China France Poland Peru
Congo, Demo. Rep.c of El Salvador Guinea-Bissau Singapore Honduras United Kingdom Portugal Poland
Congo, Republic of Sweden Equatorial Guinea Sierra Leone Iraq Greece Romania Portugal
Czechoslovakia Syrian Arab Republic Greece El Salvador Jamaica Hong Kong Senegal Paraguay
Cuba Togo Greenland Somalia Jordan Hungary Sweden Romania
Cyprus Uganda Guatemala São Tomé & Prı́ncipe Kenya Ireland United States Saudi Arabia
Germany United States Guam Suriname St. Kitts and Nevis Iceland South Africa Sudan
Denmark Venezuela Guyana Sweden Kuwait Israel Same as Baier and Bergstrand (2007) Senegal
Dominican Republic Vietnam Hong Kong Syrian Arab Republic Lebanon Italy Angola Singapore
Algeria Yugoslavia, SFR Honduras Chad Libya Jordan Albania Sierra Leone
Spain South Africa Haiti Togo St. Lucia Japan Australia El Salvador
Ethiopia Spreading 55 years Hungary Taiwan Macao Kenya Austria Sweden
Finland Afghanistan Ireland Tanzania Maldives Kuwait Burkina Faso Syrian Arab Republic
France Angola Iraq Uganda Marshall Islands Macao Bulgaria Uganda
Gabon Albania Iceland United States Mongolia Malta Switzerland United States
United Kingdom Netherlands Antilles Israel Venezuela Montserrat Myanmar Côte d’Ivoire Venezuela
Ghana United Arab Emirates Italy Vietnam Mauritius Mauritius Congo, Republic of Zimbabwe
Guinea Australia Jamaica Vanuatu Namibia Niger Cyprus
Greece Austria Jordan Samoa New Caledonia Netherlands Germany
Guatemala Benin Japan Yemen, Republic of Nicaragua Norway Denmark
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Table A4: LSDV Estimates from Samples with Different Coverage of Countries












Baier and Bergstrand (2007)
Bilateral (<1993) 0.046 0.134 0.049 -0.086 -0.029 -0.031 -0.054
(0.301) (0.790) (0.261) (-0.265) (-0.204) (-0.226) (-0.316)
Bilateral (≥1993) -0.199∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗ -0.101 -0.207∗∗ -0.039 0.043 -0.117∗
(-4.060) (-2.347) (-1.601) (-2.376) (-0.550) (0.573) (-1.862)
CU 1.148∗∗∗ 1.011∗∗∗ 1.122∗∗∗ 0.856∗∗∗ 1.147∗∗∗ 0.957∗∗∗ 0.995∗∗∗
(13.817) (10.741) (8.355) (4.908) (4.757) (3.275) (7.881)
FTA 0.714∗∗∗ 0.770∗∗∗ 0.643∗∗∗ 0.906∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ 0.510∗∗∗
(9.069) (7.884) (6.141) (7.543) (3.288) (2.771) (3.061)
PSA 0.457∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.059 0.288∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗
(5.782) (5.403) (4.239) (0.509) (2.969) (3.121) (3.647)
CU and EIA 0.931∗∗∗ 1.120∗∗∗ 1.246∗∗∗ 1.773∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 1.617∗∗∗
(5.688) (5.355) (3.444) (5.918) (.) (.) (5.984)
FTA and EIA -0.753∗∗∗ -0.216 -0.242∗ -0.276 -0.378∗∗ 0.000 -0.286∗∗
(-3.556) (-1.390) (-1.723) (-0.767) (-2.110) (.) (-1.973)
PSA and EIA -0.561∗ -0.425 -0.629 -0.713∗ -0.454 -0.515 -0.644
(-1.960) (-1.221) (-1.457) (-1.739) (-1.007) (-1.123) (-1.458)
ASEAN 0.037 0.057 0.121 0.510 -0.431∗ -0.490∗ -0.777∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.213) (0.451) (1.213) (-1.721) (-1.959) (-3.127)
NAFTA -0.030 0.008 0.036 0.314 0.252∗ 0.274∗∗ 0.140
(-0.231) (0.059) (0.287) (1.303) (1.812) (1.983) (1.093)
EFTA 0.033 0.035 0.021 0.346 0.002 -0.004 -0.117∗
(0.641) (0.603) (0.369) (1.337) (0.048) (-0.080) (-1.940)
GCC -0.390∗∗ -0.418∗∗ -0.372∗∗ -0.358∗ -0.409∗ 0.000 -0.569∗∗∗
(-2.148) (-2.242) (-1.972) (-1.932) (-1.922) (.) (-3.849)
MERCOSUR 0.340∗ 0.338∗ 0.302∗ 0.346 0.081 0.086 0.343∗∗
(1.948) (1.938) (1.785) (1.565) (0.606) (0.646) (2.004)
EU 0.907∗∗∗ 0.969∗∗∗ 0.959∗∗∗ 0.000 0.667∗∗∗ 0.801∗∗∗ 0.920∗∗∗
(17.281) (14.168) (13.916) (.) (10.806) (12.240) (13.452)
EU and others 0.089∗∗∗ 0.074∗ 0.058 0.390∗ 0.010 0.037 0.051
(2.626) (1.787) (1.331) (1.681) (0.221) (0.739) (1.114)
EC and others 0.059∗ 0.079∗∗ 0.076∗∗ -1.344 0.119∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.038
(1.903) (2.272) (2.178) (-1.387) (3.498) (3.175) (1.051)
EEC and others 0.454∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗ 0.000 0.227∗∗ 0.187 0.379∗∗∗
(3.952) (3.650) (3.126) (.) (2.090) (1.620) (3.090)
Inactive RTAs -0.071 -0.049 -0.091 0.098 0.245∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 0.126∗
(-1.207) (-0.773) (-1.213) (0.708) (2.837) (2.878) (1.771)
Independence 0.098 0.174∗ 0.005 0.052 -0.098 0.636∗ 0.184
(1.316) (1.911) (0.029) (0.408) (-0.514) (1.661) (1.132)
Constant 7.393∗∗∗ 7.835∗∗∗ 8.814∗∗∗ 7.239∗∗∗ 9.951∗∗∗ 10.131∗∗∗ 8.896∗∗∗
(299.887) (321.638) (209.961) (142.692) (273.496) (169.999) (264.373)
N 802280 578828 389468 217068 187357 149227 307268
R2 0.87 0.86 0.88 0.85 0.91 0.91 0.89
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The headings of each column indicate the coverage of countries for each sample.
“Whole” means the sample covers all countries and territories as given by the dataset.
“Spreading 55 years” means the sample covers countries whose non-missing trade value
spreads over the whole sample period. In column 3, the sample covers countries which
have been independent since 1962 and also have the highest number of trade observations
until the 134th place. Observations involving Bahrain, Brunei, Qatar, Singapore, United
Arab Emirates are never dropped for the first four columns even they became independent
after 1962, because they are covered by individual RTAs including ASEAN and GCC. In
column 4, a sample of developing countries as defined by UN UNCTAD is applied. “Same
as Baier et al. (2019)” uses a sample with the same coverage of countries or territories
as in Baier et al. (2019). In column 6, those not independent in 1962 in the sample of
Baier et al. (2019) are excluded. In the last column, a sample with the same coverage of
countries or territories as in Baier and Bergstrand (2007) is used. In the next table, the
coverage of countries for each sample is defined in the same way.
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Table A5: Had They Not Been Independent: PPML Estimator













Bilateral (<1993) 0.090 0.090 0.091 -0.875 0.117∗ 0.127∗ 0.107∗
(1.445) (1.444) (1.429) (-1.347) (1.776) (1.956) (1.669)
Bilateral (≥1993) -0.126∗ -0.127∗ -0.151∗∗ -0.325∗∗∗ -0.178∗∗ 0.024 -0.163∗∗
(-1.709) (-1.714) (-2.010) (-3.558) (-2.245) (0.542) (-2.129)
CU 1.112∗∗∗ 1.111∗∗∗ 0.902∗∗∗ 0.736∗∗∗ 0.926∗∗∗ 0.848∗∗ 0.951∗∗∗
(7.701) (7.697) (5.370) (2.944) (4.769) (2.352) (5.959)
FTA 0.173∗∗ 0.173∗∗ 0.266∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ -0.161 -0.181 0.065
(2.107) (2.108) (2.478) (2.649) (-1.178) (-1.297) (0.534)
PSA 0.386∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗ 0.405∗∗∗ 0.208 0.262∗ 0.310∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗
(3.277) (3.306) (3.519) (0.944) (1.928) (2.352) (2.924)
CU & EIA 0.149 0.150 1.336∗∗ 1.442∗∗∗ 1.247∗∗∗
(1.623) (1.635) (2.053) (2.753) (2.590)
FTA& EIA 0.135 0.134 0.389 -0.964∗∗∗ -0.996∗∗∗ 0.385
(0.541) (0.540) (1.617) (-3.753) (-5.159) (1.563)
PSA & EIA 0.093 0.093 0.102 -0.031 0.119 0.041 0.105
(0.935) (0.936) (0.976) (-0.299) (1.057) (0.380) (0.905)
ASEAN 0.384∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗
(4.447) (4.448) (4.617) (3.458) (4.805) (3.279) (4.612)
NAFTA 0.212∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗
(2.737) (2.719) (2.487) (2.708) (3.346) (3.777) (3.020)
EFTA -0.007 -0.018 -0.055 -0.060 -0.116∗∗ -0.050
(-0.111) (-0.307) (-0.831) (-0.906) (-2.079) (-0.740)
GCC -0.102 -0.102 -0.112 -0.189 -0.371∗∗∗ -0.269∗∗∗
(-0.871) (-0.874) (-0.941) (-1.498) (-3.414) (-4.804)
MERCOSUR 0.515∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗
(3.355) (3.351) (3.344) (2.572) (4.620) (4.818) (3.221)
EU 0.379∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗ 0.410∗∗∗
(8.275) (9.602) (9.062) (7.308) (7.448) (8.376)
EU and others -0.114∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ 0.371∗ -0.157∗∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗
(-3.195) (-3.043) (-3.298) (1.819) (-3.546) (-3.026) (-3.613)
EC and others -0.013 -0.008 -0.039 -0.199 -0.013 -0.010 -0.019
(-0.517) (-0.338) (-1.409) (-0.186) (-0.450) (-0.333) (-0.653)
EEC and others 0.176∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
(3.307) (3.178) (2.899) (4.708) (4.790) (3.359)
Inactive RTAs 0.036 0.038 0.057 0.049 0.098∗∗ 0.097∗∗ 0.076
(0.750) (0.796) (1.145) (0.220) (1.980) (1.989) (1.539)
Independence -0.465∗∗ -0.704∗∗∗ 0.996
(-2.037) (-3.688) (1.382)
N 773153 772914 388892 194744 186570 149207 304374
R2 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A6: Had They Not Been Independent: Replacement for the Whole Period













Bilateral (<1993) 0.123∗ 0.126∗ 0.122∗ -0.875 0.132∗ 0.131∗∗ 0.133∗∗
(1.871) (1.908) (1.812) (-1.341) (1.922) (2.015) (2.019)
Bilateral (≥1993) -0.145∗ -0.183∗∗ -0.177∗∗ -0.431∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗ 0.024 -0.186∗∗
(-1.743) (-2.096) (-2.139) (-5.160) (-2.345) (0.530) (-2.122)
CU 0.882∗∗∗ 0.881∗∗∗ 0.879∗∗∗ 0.712∗∗∗ 0.896∗∗ 0.847∗∗ 0.952∗∗∗
(5.589) (5.602) (5.134) (2.732) (2.487) (2.349) (5.423)
FTA 0.047 0.181 0.189 0.387∗∗∗ -0.143 -0.179 0.070
(0.534) (1.542) (1.604) (2.875) (-1.011) (-1.284) (0.577)
PSA 0.342∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.318 0.204 0.307∗∗ 0.314∗∗
(2.764) (2.817) (2.952) (1.401) (1.444) (2.325) (2.510)
CU & EIA 0.030
(0.313)
FTA & EIA -0.283 -0.284 -0.265 -0.274
(-1.166) (-1.235) (-1.102) (-1.094)
PSA & EIA 0.066 0.068 0.079 -0.082 0.106 0.043 0.101
(0.679) (0.673) (0.774) (-0.803) (0.964) (0.397) (0.876)
ASEAN 0.282∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.178∗ 0.362∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗
(2.953) (2.976) (3.091) (1.712) (3.571) (3.286) (3.583)
NAFTA 0.275∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗
(3.360) (3.389) (3.115) (2.913) (3.610) (3.795) (3.266)
EFTA 0.057 0.016 0.007 -0.013 -0.113∗∗ -0.006
(0.908) (0.238) (0.095) (-0.193) (-2.008) (-0.090)
GCC 0.487 0.389 0.366 0.170
(1.562) (1.249) (1.181) (0.655)
MERCOSUR 0.497∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ 0.502∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗ 0.503∗∗∗
(3.261) (3.239) (3.281) (2.758) (4.559) (4.800) (3.198)
EU 0.352∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗ 0.414∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗
(6.960) (7.438) (7.634) (6.489) (7.422) (7.521)
EU and others -0.020 -0.032 -0.032 0.389∗ -0.066 -0.130∗∗∗ -0.084∗
(-0.394) (-0.590) (-0.580) (1.798) (-1.010) (-2.926) (-1.773)
EC and others 0.087∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗ 0.066∗∗ -0.080 0.060∗ -0.005 0.040
(3.012) (2.421) (2.028) (-0.089) (1.825) (-0.161) (1.366)
EEC and others 0.121∗∗ 0.098∗∗ 0.106∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
(2.521) (2.042) (2.177) (4.374) (4.831) (2.682)
Inactive RTAs -0.022 0.008 0.002 0.006 0.043 0.094∗ 0.045
(-0.454) (0.154) (0.030) (0.024) (0.813) (1.925) (0.912)
Independence -0.327 -0.166 1.911∗∗∗
(-1.341) (-0.272) (2.855)
N 507014 386075 326275 111480 154265 144994 242723
R2 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: Trade involving newly independent countries or dependent territories is as part of the
trade of their (previous) colonizers through the whole sample period. Coverage of countries
for each column is specified the same as in Table A4.
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Table A7: Colonies Share RTA Memberships of Their Colonizers/Governers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)











Bilateral (<1993) 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.076 0.076 0.076
(1.245) (1.240) (1.245) (1.255) (1.253) (1.257)
Bilateral (≥1993) -0.127∗ -0.127∗ -0.127∗ -0.155∗∗ -0.155∗∗ -0.155∗∗
(-1.719) (-1.718) (-1.718) (-2.014) (-2.013) (-2.013)
CU 1.109∗∗∗ 1.110∗∗∗ 1.111∗∗∗ 0.930∗∗∗ 0.930∗∗∗ 0.931∗∗∗
(7.719) (7.727) (7.728) (6.783) (6.787) (6.789)
FTA 0.174∗∗ 0.172∗∗ 0.172∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗
(2.125) (2.109) (2.111) (2.805) (2.788) (2.789)
PSA 0.388∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗
(3.308) (3.300) (3.301) (3.437) (3.427) (3.428)
CU & EIA 0.152∗ 0.149 0.149 1.288∗∗∗ 1.231∗∗∗ 1.231∗∗∗
(1.663) (1.640) (1.642) (3.783) (3.696) (3.696)
FTA & EIA 0.134 0.134 0.134 0.355 0.355 0.355
(0.540) (0.540) (0.540) (1.450) (1.449) (1.449)
PSA & EIA 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.096 0.096 0.096
(0.936) (0.936) (0.936) (0.934) (0.934) (0.934)
ASEAN 0.384∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗
(4.450) (4.453) (4.453) (4.495) (4.498) (4.496)
NAFTA 0.207∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗
(2.691) (2.698) (2.702) (2.689) (2.696) (2.700)
EFTA and others -0.017 -0.014 -0.014 -0.059 -0.055 -0.056
(-0.289) (-0.238) (-0.239) (-0.911) (-0.861) (-0.861)
GCC and others -0.103 -0.103 -0.103 -0.134 -0.134 -0.134
(-0.879) (-0.876) (-0.876) (-1.115) (-1.111) (-1.111)
MERCOSUR 0.514∗∗∗ 0.514∗∗∗ 0.514∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗
(3.347) (3.349) (3.349) (3.318) (3.320) (3.320)
EU 0.397∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗∗ 0.423∗∗∗
(9.518) (9.455) (9.454) (9.023) (8.961) (8.959)
EU and others -0.108∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗
(-3.033) (-3.033) (-3.036) (-3.468) (-3.469) (-3.472)
EC and others -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.040 -0.041 -0.041
(-0.297) (-0.319) (-0.321) (-1.457) (-1.479) (-1.480)
EEC and others 0.164∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗
(3.134) (3.137) (3.161) (2.813) (2.817) (2.841)
Inactive RTAs 0.034 0.035 0.035 0.065 0.065 0.065
(0.724) (0.733) (0.736) (1.296) (1.307) (1.309)
Split 0.196∗∗ 0.191∗∗ 0.192∗∗ 0.186∗∗
(2.215) (2.179) (2.046) (2.013)
N 804496 804204 804204 580224 579407 579407
R2 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A8: Optimal Sample: PPML
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1975-2015 Excluding 1992-2015 Excluding
Dependent Dependent & Dependent Dependent &
Not Yet Independent Not Yet Independent
Bilateral (<1993) 0.012 0.033 -0.119 -0.118
(0.200) (0.547) (-1.196) (-1.123)
Bilateral (≥1993) 0.038 0.018 0.064∗ 0.044
(0.993) (0.434) (1.835) (1.215)
CU 1.005∗∗∗ 0.974∗∗∗ 0.666∗∗∗ 0.671∗∗∗
(6.846) (6.609) (3.547) (3.508)
FTA 0.142∗ 0.214∗∗ -0.188∗∗∗ -0.197∗∗∗
(1.785) (2.144) (-3.056) (-2.668)
PSA 0.298∗∗ 0.327∗∗∗ -0.055 -0.001
(2.441) (2.722) (-0.475) (-0.005)
CU & EIA 0.226∗∗∗ 1.021 -0.309 -0.332
(2.923) (1.470) (-1.579) (-0.770)
FTA & EIA 0.150 0.411∗ 0.178 0.507∗
(0.590) (1.802) (0.631) (1.878)
PSA & EIA 0.003 0.010 -0.008 -0.002
(0.032) (0.111) (-0.082) (-0.016)
ASEAN 0.328∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗
(3.849) (3.616) (3.800) (3.567)
NAFTA 0.160∗∗ 0.162∗∗ -0.039 -0.048
(2.079) (2.095) (-0.407) (-0.485)
EFTA -0.057 -0.104∗ -0.030 -0.081
(-1.048) (-1.818) (-0.392) (-0.965)
GCC -0.064 -0.087 -0.143 -0.143
(-0.544) (-0.727) (-1.168) (-1.163)
MERCOSUR 0.503∗∗∗ 0.504∗∗∗ 0.356∗ 0.361∗
(3.230) (3.217) (1.880) (1.890)
EU 0.366∗∗∗ 0.407∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗
(8.442) (8.378) (5.536) (5.445)
EU and others -0.090∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗ -0.041 -0.068∗
(-2.495) (-2.895) (-1.153) (-1.751)
EC and others -0.002 -0.024 -0.013 -0.033
(-0.078) (-0.907) (-0.544) (-1.230)
EEC and others 0.167∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗
(3.356) (2.891)
Inactive RTAs 0.025 0.057 -0.557∗∗∗ 0.185
(0.506) (1.150) (-2.779) (0.448)
N 653020 468174 489248 323081
R2 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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CU and EIA 0
FTA and EIA 0.51







EU and Other countries -0.11
EEC and Other countries 0
EC and Other countries -0.56
Inactive RTAs 0
Table A10: Effects of Missing Values Caused by Occurrence of New Countries: LSDV
Method CU FTA PSA ASEAN EU EU Others
Panel A: (10,10,10) independent in (1990,1995,2000)
Occurrence of 0.97 -0.199 0.339 0.313 0.409 -0.107
New Countries (0.034) (0.034) (0.096) (0.170) (0.081) (0.050)
[0.037] [0.030] [0.087] [0.191] [0.077] [0.049]
Random 0.969 -0.198 0.335 0.311 0.409 -0.106
Missing (0.032) (0.032) (0.090) (0.150) (0.060) (0.040)
[0.033] [0.030] [0.083] [0.166] [0.061] [0.040]
Missing of Min. Values 0.905 -0.171 0.283 0.361 0.401 -0.109
(0.031) (0.031) (0.085) (0.141) (0.057) (0.037)
[0.033] [0.029] [0.082] [0.152] [0.060] [0.038]
Panel B: (10,10,30) independent in (1990,1995,2000)
Occurrence of 0.968 -0.201 0.330 0.306 0.414 -0.116
New Countries (0.039) (0.038) (0.109) (0.190) (0.086) (0.053)
[0.043] [0.036] [0.104] [0.248] [0.092] [0.055]
Random 0.969 -0.197 0.323 0.321 0.411 -0.108
Missing (0.035) (0.035) (0.100 (0.165) (0.065) (0.043)
[0.037] [0.032] [0.091] [0.164] [0.065] [0.044]
Missing of Min. Values 0.814 -0.142 0.264 0.383 0.423 -0.095
(0.033) (0.032) (0.088) (0.144) (0.057) (0.037)
[0.033] [0.030] [0.090] [0.145] [0.057] [0.040]
Panel C: (30,10,30) independent in (1990,1995,2000)
Occurrence of 0.970 -0.204 0.336 0.298 0.400 -0.118
New Countries (0.039) (0.038) (0.111) (0.177) (0.085) (0.052)
[0.037] [0.038] [0.111] [0.187] [0.082] [0.050]
Random 0.970 -0.205 0.333 0.304 0.414 -0.115
Missing (0.036) (0.037) (0.101) (0.170) (0.068) (0.045)
[0.035] [0.035] [0.101] [0.168] [0.069] [0.046]
Missing of Min. Values 0.775 -0.134 0.271 0.383 0.430 -0.092
(0.034) (0.032) (0.089) (0.147) (0.057) (0.038)
[0.036] [0.035] [0.090] [0.143] [0.058] [0.040]
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